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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. R 
132-134. 
Relief should be granted because both Mr. Reid's Brady1 claim and his claim of material 
facts, not previously presented and heard, requires vacation of the sentence in the interest of 
justice, were erroneously summarily dismissed. Both claims require an evidentiary hearing. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
Petitioner-Appellant Corey Reid was convicted following a jury trial of two counts of 
aiding and abetting first degree murder. He was sentenced to terms of 30 years to life, and the 
convictions were affirmed on appeal. State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80,253 P.3d 754 (2011).2 
Mr. Reid filed a timely prose petition for post-conviction relief. R 4-27. He raised two 
claims: I) that the conviction and sentence violate the state and federal constitutions; and 2) that 
there is new evidence of material facts not previously presented and heard that requires vacating 
the conviction and/or sentence in the interest of justice. R 5. 
With regard to the new evidence claim, Mr. Reid cited newly discovered evidence 
regarding the state's witness Ronald Rollins. Rollins' statements that Mr. Reid had confessed to 
him while they were both held in the county jail were used at sentencing against Mr. Reid. The 
new evidence included that Mr. Rollins had recanted his statements used at Mr. Reid's 
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). 
2 A motion for this Court to augment the record in this appeal with the record from the 
underlying direct appeal is pending. 
sentencing, that Mr. Rollins was given police reports to read prior to making his statements, and 
that Mr. Rollins' girlfriend had told the PSI investigator in Mr. Rollins' case that he is a 
pathological liar. R 13-14. 
Mr. Reid also raised a Brady claim. In particular, the state did not disclose information 
that Rollins' girlfriend had told the PSI investigator in Rollins' case that Rollins is a pathological 
liar. R 14. 
The district court appointed counsel. R 42. 
The state filed an answer, R 45-48, as well as a motion to take judicial notice of records, 
transcripts, PSI and exhibits in the underlying criminal case, CR-2008-2473. R 49-51. The court 
granted the motion for judicial notice. R 52-53. 
Mr. Reid's counsel filed an affidavit from Mr. Reid, R 62-65, as well as an amended 
petition. R 69-73. This petition raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (Sixth 
Amendment) and violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments denying a fair trial 
and due process. The basis for all the claims was the following: 
... specifically, counsel should have made an opening statement at the beginning 
of the case rather than reserve; counsel should have advised me after Judge Gibler 
denied our Rule 29 motion, that I should testify, and I would have testified had he 
advised me competently. And I should have been permitted to testify; defense 
counsel should have pointed out to the Court at sentencing that Mr. Rollins' 
accounts were somewhat accurate, not because petitioner said things to him, but 
because Mr. Rollins read the police reports; prosecutorial misconduct (Brady 
violation) for failing to advise defense counsel that Mr. Rollins' girlfriend stated 
that Mr. Rollins was a pathological liar in Mr. Rollins'presentence investigation 
report; that the information contained in Rollins' PSI is newly discovered 




The state filed an answer. R 74-78. 
The state also filed a motion for summary dismissal. R 85-87. Relevant to this appeal, 
the state argued that: 
1) the Brady claim failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding favorable 
evidence that was exculpatory or impeaching, suppressed by the state willfully or inadvertently, 
and with resulting prejudice; 
2) the newly discovered evidence claim failed to meet the criteria ofICR 34, I.C. § 19-
2406, and the four part test of State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P .2d 972 (1976); 
3) the assertions that the same claims resulted in a violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and due process failed to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
The state further argued that challenges to the credibility of Mr. Rollins and his testimony 
at trial3 and arguments at sentencing were or could have been raised on direct appeal and 
therefore are barred by res judiciata and the law of the case. R 85-86. 
Mr. Reid filed a response to the state's motion. R 119-120. 
At the hearing on the motion for summary dismissal, the state argued that dismissal was 
appropriate because," ... even if all of the facts and information in his affidavit that Mr. Reid 
has submitted to the Court were true, it does not entitle him to judgment as a matter of law on the 
specific Stricklancf standard set forth for ineffective assistance of counsel." Tr. 1/13/14, p. 6, ln. 
4-8. 
3 Mr. Rollins did not testify at trial. Tr. 1/13/14, p. 25, ln. 24-25. 
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
3 
The state further argued that issues regarding Rollins' credibility were decided in the 
direct appeal and therefore Mr. Reid's post-conviction claims were barred by law of the case. Tr. 
1/13/14, p. 6, ln. 16-p. 7, ln. 5. 
With regard to the Brady claim, the state argued that it had no duty to disclose because 
the information about Mr. Rollins was not discovered until after Mr. Reid was sentenced and 
because the information was discovered in another county and not the county of Mr. Reid's 
conviction. Tr. 1/13/14, p. 7, ln. 6-17. See also, R 102-103. 
As to the newly discovered evidence claim, the state argued that Mr. Reid was not 
entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the district court found that Mr. Rollins lacked 
credibility at the time of the original sentencing. Tr. 1/13/14, p. 7, ln. 20 - p. 8, ln. 2. 
The district court granted summary dismissal. R 128-13 0. In dismissing the Brady 
claim/newly discovered evidence claim, the court reasoned as follows: 
The next issue involves counsel's failure to tell the court at the time of sentencing, 
that Mr. Rollins, whose statement was simply used at sentencing, not at trial, the 
failure to tell the Court that he was a pathological liar and that he had reviewed 
police reports which gave him information about the case. This was something 
that was considered on appeal. I don't know as that is determinative of the issue 
here because this is a post-conviction relief case. What's not clear to me is how 
this is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It was the statement used at 
sentencing. And as the Supreme Court has made clear on many occasions, the 
Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing. And it's really up to me to 
determine what's reliable and credible at sentencing and what isn't. 
As far as and so certainly the record shows and it is correct that Mr. Smith 
raised the proper arguments at sentencing that there had been no opportunity to 
cross-examine Mr. Rollins, the statement was hearsay. And I thought those were 
arguments that were well taken because, when I ruled on this at sentencing - or 
when I did the sentencing, I noted that I was very skeptical of Mr. Rollins's 
account. And so again, there's been no evidence to show that somehow Mr. 
Smith's conduct here fell below reasonable standards of performance for an 
attorney. 
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More importantly, this claim fails the second prong of Strickland that requires 
that, even if one presumes ineffective assistance of counsel, which I do not, but 
even if one presumes that, that the outcomes would have been different. In my 
comments at the time of sentencing, I noted again the skepticism over Rollins's 
statements. More importantly, my sentencing decision was made based upon the 
evidence I'd heard in the trial, the other information presented in the presentence 
report, and the weighed against the goals of sentencing: protection of the public, 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and punishment. And so even if the claim is allowed 
that it was somehow inefficient assistance of counsel, the outcome would be no 
different if there were to be a resentencing. 
The next and final claim is a claim what I understand is an alleged Brady violation 
for the prosecutor's failing to advise defense counsel that Rollins was a liar. 
Again it should be noted that Rollins's statement was used at sentencing, not at 
trial. And how this is inefficient assistance of counsel is not clear to me. I don't 
see that this allegation really involves decisions made by Mr. Smith. As I noted, 
Mr. Smith did make the appropriate objections to the Rollins statements at the 
time of sentencing. 
The claim seems to be one here against the State for failing to disclose some 
evidence. This certainly could have been raised on appeal, but it seems in looking 
at the claim, that the evidence that the state was supposed to - allegedly supposed 
to have provided was not even known by the state at the time of sentencing. 
Again, even if one presumes that somehow this was ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the outcome would remain the same. This would certainly not alter the 
sentence that I imposed. 
So accordingly the motion for summary disposition is granted. The no genuine 
issues of material fact have been raised, and the petition will be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Tr. 1/13/14, p. 24, ln. 4 -p. 26, ln. 19. 
A final judgment was entered. R 130-131. And, this appeal timely follows. R 132-134. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing the Brady claim based on its analysis 
that the claim could have been raised on appeal and that in any event there was no proof of 
Strickland prejudice? 
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2. Did the district court err in not setting the case for an evidentiary hearing on the claim 
that newly discovered evidence requires a new sentencing hearing? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erroneously Dismissed the Brady Claim 
1. Standard of Review 
Summary disposition [ of a petition for post-conviction relief] is appropriate if the 
applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact. LC. § 19-4906(b), 
( c ). On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, [the appellate court] will determine whether a genuine issue 
of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions together with 
any affidavit on file and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences 
in favor of the non-moving party. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 
P.3d 787, 791 (2002). A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted 
allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. Ferrier v. 
State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). When the alleged facts, even 
if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the 
application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 
542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). Allegations contained in the application 
are insufficient for the granting ofreliefwhen (1) they are clearly disproved by the 
record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law. 
Id. 
Hanschultz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 83 8, 172 P .3d 1109, 1113 (2007). 
When the facts alleged by the petitioner, if true, would entitle him to relief, summary 
disposition is inappropriate. Id., 144 Idaho at 839, 172 P.3d at 1114. 
2. The District Court Erred in its Analysis of the Brady Claim 
The district court analyzed Mr. Reid's Brady claim both as a claim that could have been 
raised on direct appeal and was not and as an ineffective ( or as the court termed it "inefficient") 
assistance of trial counsel claim finding no prejudice and therefore summarily dismissing the 
claim. 
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Both of these analyses are erroneous. 
Mr. Reid's Brady claim could not have been raised in direct appeal because the facts 
underlying the claim were not and could not have been developed in the trial. Mr. Reid could not 
have brought forth facts regarding Rollins' credibility at trial because Rollins was not a witness 
at trial and Mr. Reid could not have brought forth facts of the failure to disclose Rollins' 
girlfriend's statements for Rollins' PSI interview as those statements were not made until after 
trial. Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421,426, 745 P.2d 300,305 (Ct. App. 1987), stating" ... post-
conviction proceedings do not preclude claims or issues based upon facts beyond the record 
presented on appeal, if those facts could not, or customarily would not, have been developed in 
the trial on criminal charges." 
Likewise, the Brady claim should not have been summarily dismissed because Mr. Reid 
did not present evidence to meet the Strickland deficiency and prejudice prongs of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel test. A Brady claim is distinct from a Strickland claim. 
[The constitution] requires that the prosecution disclose all exculpatory evidence. 
This duty to disclose encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory 
evidence. A defendant's due process rights are violated where the prosecution 
fails to disclose exculpatory evidence that is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 
Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome. 
State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68, 72-73, 14 P.3d 388, 392-393 (Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted). 
In determining that a Brady claim should have been raised in appeal and then applying 
the ineffective assistance of counsel standard to the claim, the district court erred in its analysis 
of the Brady claim. 
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3. A Proper Brady Analysis Demonstrates that Summary Disposition is 
Inappropriate 
To properly analyze Mr. Reid's Brady claim, a review of the evidence presented at trial 
and the record of the sentencing hearing is necessary. The evidence at trial was summarized by 
the Court of Appeals in the direct appeal: 
On August 4, 2008, Reid, Jon Kienholz, Hiram Wilson, Neil Howard, and 
Cynthia Bewick were at a campground at Dobson Pass outside of Wallace, Idaho. 
Kienholz shot and killed Howard and Bewick. Reid was charged with aiding and 
abetting in both murders. Kienholz and Wilson testified against Reid at trial. 
According to Kienholz's testimony, he developed a plan to drive to Bolivia and 
earn a living there selling illegal substances. Reid wanted to go with him because 
of an upcoming legal proceeding. Howard and Bewick, who were dating, also 
wanted to go because they thought they had outstanding warrants for their arrest. 
The group planned to drive Howard's vehicle. On the morning of the murders, 
Kienholz called a friend and arranged to trade marijuana for a pistol. Reid was in 
the car and overheard Kienholz's conversation. Kienholz dropped off Reid, 
bought a .22 caliber pistol, and then returned for Reid. Reid observed the pistol. 
They then picked up Reid's girlfriend, Kristen Purtill, and drove to the house 
where Howard and Bewick were staying. It was there that Howard and Bewick 
told Kienholz that they thought Purtill was going to tum them in on their warrants. 
Kienholz told Reid about this accusation and both Reid and Purtill became angry. 
Kienholz obtained a full box of .22 ammunition. The group of five drove to 
Dobson Pass and stopped at a campsite, almost a mile off of the road, where they 
started a fire. Kienholz and Reid decided to take a short trip to town, leaving 
Purtill, Howard, and Bewick at the campsite. However, when Howard got his 
pocket knife out of the car, Purtill refused to stay. Kienholz, Reid, and Purtill 
then left in Howard's vehicle. As the three drove away from the campsite, Reid 
became angry that Howard retrieved his knife and told Kienholz "We have to kill 
them." They dropped off Purtill in town and picked up Reid's cousin, Wilson. 
Reid told Wilson that they were going to kill Howard and Bewick. The three then 
returned to Dobson Pass and parked on the main road. Wilson retrieved the pistol 
and Reid retrieved the .22 shells to give to Kienholz. The three then walked to the 
campground and talked about how they would commit the murders. With the 
pistol hidden below Kienholz's shirt, the three walked into the campground. 
Kienholz talked to Howard while glancing at Reid. Reid was silently mouthing 
the words to Kienholz "Come on, do it." Kienholz shot Howard in the head, and 
then shot Bewick. Kienholz and Wilson then dumped the bodies down a hill. As 
the three headed back to the car, Reid removed a number of .22 shells from his 
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pocket and discarded them. The three then picked up Purtill and drove to Boise. 
According to Wilson's testimony, when Wilson got in the vehicle with Kienholz 
and Reid, Reid told Wilson that they needed to kill Howard and Bewick. On the 
drive to Dobson Pass, Kienholz and Reid talked about how they were going to 
commit the murders. When the vehicle stopped, Reid got the shells out of the 
glove box, handed Kienholz six shells, and kept a number in his own pocket in 
case Kienholz missed. As the three were waiting outside the campsite, Reid told 
Kienholz to just walk into the campsite and shoot them. The three then walked 
into the campsite, and Kienholz talked to Howard. Wilson did not see Reid 
mouth any words to Kienholz. Kienholz shot Howard once, kicked Bewick, shot 
her four times, and then shot Howard again. Wilson and Kienholz then disposed 
of the bodies. On the walk back, Reid discarded the shells from his pocket. The 
group traveled to Boise, where Reid assured Kienholz that it had to be done 
because Howard was going to kill Purtill. After running out of money, Wilson 
returned home and turned himself in to the police. 
The jury convicted Reid of aiding and abetting in the first degree murders of 
Howard and Bewick. For sentencing purposes, the State submitted a transcript of 
a conversation between Detective Morgan and Ronald Rollins, a prior cellmate of 
Reid's, in which Rollins described conversations with Reid regarding the murders. 
The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of life with thirty years 
determinate on each count. Reid appeals. 
State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 82-83, 253 P.3d 754, 756-57 (Ct. App. 2011). 
At sentencing, the defense and state agreed to use a presentence investigation report (PSI) 
prepared for a 2008 conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Trial Tr. p. 758, ln. 2-7, 
p. 786, ln. 18-20. The PSI was an exhibit on appeal. Tr R 404. 
That PSI reported a minimal criminal history. Mr. Reid who was 21 at the time of 
sentencing, had two prior offenses of tobacco possession/distribution/use by a minor, two alcohol 
possession by a minor, a failure to provide proof of insurance and failure to register a vehicle, a 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and a driving under the influence. He had no prior violent 
offense convictions. PSI p. 3-4. 
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A court ordered substance abuse evaluation was also prepared and is in the record of the 
direct appeal. Tr R 404. The evaluation found that Mr. Reid has alcohol dependence, 
amphetamine dependence, cannabis dependence, and cocaine dependence. Ex. Evaluation from 
Alliance Family Services, p. 1. 
The day of sentencing, the state filed "Documentation in Support of State's Sentencing 
Recommendation." Tr R 354-378. Based upon this documentation, the state asked for a 
sentence greater than that which had been imposed on Mr. Kienholz. Trial Tr. p. 763, ln. 23 - p. 
768, In. 11; p. 784, ln. 1-4. 
The state's documentation was a "draft" Idaho State Police Report which included the 
transcript of an unswom interview between Detective Morgan, a deputy prosecuting attorney, and 
Ronald Rollins, Jr., conducted on January 22, 2009. Tr R 357. (Mr. Reid's trial was held in May 
2009.) This interview was highly damaging to Mr. Reid. 
The narrative summary is as follows: 
1. On 01-22-09, at approximately 1130 hours, Ronald ROLLINS Jr. Was 
interviewed by Deputy Prosecutor Verharen and me [Officer Terry Morgan]. The 
interview was regarding conversations that Corey REID had with ROLLINS about 
REID's involvement in the deaths ofNeil HOWARD and Cynthia BEWICK. 
ROLLINS was housed in the same area as REID in the Shoshone County Jail. 
ROLLINS was incarcerated on misdemeanor probation violation charges and was 
booked into jail on 11-14-08. 
2. REID started talking to ROLLINS about REID's involvement in the murders 
within hours after meeting ROLLINS. REID would laugh when he told the story 
about involvement with the murders. ROLLINS said REID told him how he 
(REID) kicked BEWICK in the jaw and broke her jaw off the side of her face 
when she was begging Jon KIEHOLZ to stop shooting her and then REID would 
laugh about what he did and how she looked. 
3. REID said he stood behind BEWICK and made his hand into the shape of a 
gun and was motioning to KIENHOLZ to shoot her. He said he planned the 
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killing of HOWARD and BEWICK with KIENHOLZ several days prior to 08-04-
08. REID said Hiram WILSON did not know anything about the shooting of 
HOWARD and BEWICK until it happened and that REID threatened to shoot 
WILSON if he (WILSON) didn't help dispose of the bodies. 
4. REID said he and KIENHOLZ got caught by a friend's father while trying to 
get into a gun safe prior to finally obtaining the .22 caliber gun they got. The gun 
they had was obtained from someone who lives near the Wallace cemetery and it 
was obtained by pawning something to get money to buy marijuana and trade 
marijuana for the gun. 
5. REID said Christan PURTILL did not have knowledge of the planning or 
killing until after it happened. REID said he was going to use the defense that 
KIENHOLZ was going to kill him (REID) if he (REID) didn't help kill 
HOWARD and BEWICK. ROLLINS asked REID ifhe was afraid KIENHOLZ 
was going to shoot him and REID said "hell, no, we planned this for several days 
before the killing". 
6. The interview was concluded at approximately 1245 hours. Refer to the DVD 
(Exhibit #222) for complete interview and details. 
Tr R 355-356. 
The transcript of the entire interview was included with the documentation. Tr R 357-
378. 
At sentencing, defense counsel argued against reliance on Rollins' interview. Trial Tr. p. 
770, In. 15 - p. 771, ln. 5. 
However, the district court did rely on the interview. The court stated: 
... The state submitted documentation in support of sentencing consisting 
primarily of the transcript of the interview of Ronald Rollins, Jr., that was taken in 
jail. And Mr. Smith quite properly has pointed out that we have nothing to judge 
the credibility of Mr. Rollins. He's not here. He's not subject to cross-
examination. And I recognize that and recognize that, without live testimony and 
cross-examination, the statements should be taken with a grain of salt. 
But one thing that occurred to me, as I was looking through the statements, was 
that the statements were made prior to the trial or any real discussion of the facts 
of the case. And Mr. Rollins did have a good knowledge of the facts of the case 
11 
based upon what he stated that Mr. Reid had told him while they were in jail 
together. And so, recognizing that he was not subject to cross-examination, there 
is some evidence just from the statements, themselves, that they do have an 
element of credibility because he has details that would not have been know to 
him except had they been given him by Mr. Reid, as he stated. And I'm referring 
there to elements that - or details of the facts that came out during trial. 
The facts involving Mr. Reid's involvements in these crimes is important. It's 
correct, as Mr. Smith has pointed out, that Mr. Reid did not pull the trigger. But 
as shown by the testimony at trial and the information submitted for sentencing, 
Mr. Reid does have responsibility for the cold-blooded murder of these two 
victims. The murders were initiated by Mr. Reid. It's not simply a case where he 
made a suggestion to Mr. Kienholz. It went beyond that. There was planning that 
was involved. He helped plan the murders, and he voluntarily and actively 
participated in the murders. 
Today he has apologized for his actions, but beyond that there's been little 
presented to me to show that he, first of all, really appreciates his role in these 
crimes, and I question the sincerity of his statements ofremorse made here today. 
The facts of his involvement in these crimes show that he, as I stated, was an 
active participant. 
Trial Tr. p. 788, ln. 19 - p. 790, ln. 6. 
Mr. Reid was sentenced on September 24, 2009. Trial Tr. p. 757, In. 13. 
On March 4, 2010, a PSI was filed in State v. Rollins, CR-2009-0023129, Kootenai 
County. On July 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals filed its opinion in Mr. Rollins' appeal. State v. 
Rollins, 152 Idaho 106,266 P.3d 1211 (Ct. App. 2011). The Court summarized Mr. Rollins' PSI 
noting Mr. Rollins' criminal history, including several crimes of dishonesty, the history of mental 
illness in his family, his ex-girlfriend's statement that he is a pathological liar, had stolen from 
her, had caused her severe financial difficulties and possibly had mental health problems similar 
to his mother, a recitation of his history of drug addiction spanning over the time he had given 
the statement used in Mr. Reid's case, and Mr. Rollins' statement that he would like a mental 
health evaluation. 152 Idaho at 108,266 P.3d at 1213, R 21. 
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In his pro se petition, Mr. Reid claimed that the information in the Rollins PSI, which 
was not shared with him was both new evidence and a Brady violation insofar as the state never 
disclosed this information to him. R 13-14. These claims were restated in the amended petition. 
R 70. 
The state argued in its memorandum in support of its motion for summary dismissal that 
there was not a basis for a Brady claim because the withheld information was obtained by the 
state after the sentencing hearing and because it was in the possession of Kootenai County, not 
the Shoshone County prosecutor. Lastly, the state argued that there could have been no prejudice 
to Mr. Reid because the district court gave no credibility to Mr. Rollins' statement at sentencing. 
R 102-103. 
The state's arguments, although not considered by the district court, were invalid. The 
duty to provide discovery under Brady is not limited to the time before trial; rather, it is an 
ongoing responsibility, which extends throughout the duration of the trial and even after 
conviction. Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749-750 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Pratt, 69 
Cal.App.4th 1294, 1312 (Cal. App. 1999); People v. Kasim, 56 Cal.App. 4th 1360, 1383-1884 
(Cal. App. 1997). But see, District Attorney's Office of the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 
S.Ct. 2308, 2320 (2009), stating that Brady does not apply in a post-conviction request for access 
to DNA evidence. 
And, further, although the state argues that the county prosecutor did not have a duty to 
disclose exculpatory or impeaching evidence obtained by a different county, in fact, the state's 
officers included the Attorney General by the time both Mr. Reid's and Mr. Rollins' cases were 
on appeal - and the Attorney General was clearly aware of both the use of Mr. Rollins' 
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statements against Mr. Reid in Mr. Reid's case and of the evidence obtained in conjunction with 
Mr. Rollins' PSI and thus was obligated to inform Mr. Reid of the evidence. 
Further, the district court's statements at sentencing do raise a genuine question of 
material fact as to whether the court relied on Rollins' statements in sentencing Mr. Reid. While 
the court noted that the statements were to be taken with a grain of salt, the court also said it 
found the statements reliable as demonstrated by their consistency with evidence from the trial. 
And, finally, had the evidence regarding Rollins' credibility and the state's actions in 
showing him police reports prior to making his statements been available at sentencing, there is a 
reasonable probability that a different outcome would have resulted. Mr. Reid's sentence was 
imposed after the court read statements from Rollins regarding Mr. Reid gloating over and 
laughing at the pain and deaths caused, claiming he was not afraid ofKeinholz, and speculating 
that he would escape punishment. This was all information not presented at trial, and all 
information that informed the court, through Mr. Rollins' statements, that Mr. Reid did not have 
sincere remorse for or understand the role of his actions. There is a reasonable probability that 
this belief in Mr. Reid's insincerity and lack of remorse affected the sentence imposed because 
people without remorse or understanding of their roles in wrongdoing are generally perceived to 
be more dangerous and harder to rehabilitate that those who do regret and understand their 
actions. Those who are more dangerous are deserving of longer sentences under Idaho law. 
State v. Rollins, 152 Idaho at 114, 266 P .3d at 1219. 
When the Brady claim is properly analyzed, it is clear that summary disposition was 
improperly granted because the claim does raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
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B. An Evidentiary Hearing Should Have Been Granted on the Claim that there Exists 
Evidence of Material Facts, Not Previously Presented and Heard, that Requires 
Vacation of the Sentence in the Interest of Justice 
Mr. Reid's pro se petition raised a claim of material facts, not previously presented and 
heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice. R 5. 
Specifically, Mr. Reid noted that there was evidence that Mr. Rollins had recanted his story of 
Mr. Reid's confession and behavior while in the jail and further stated that he had been bribed for 
the statement by the prosecuting attorney; evidence that the prosecutor gave Mr. Rollins 
transcripts of others' written recorded testimony to read prior to making his statement against Mr. 
Reid; and evidence that Mr. Rollins' girlfriend told a PSI investigator that Mr. Rollins is a 
pathological liar. R 13-14. 
The amended petition filed by counsel carried this claim forward by asserting that a new 
sentencing hearing was required because his attorney did not inform the sentencing court that Mr. 
Rollins had read the police reports before giving his statement used at sentencing to the 
prosecutor and because the information in Mr. Rollins' PSI was newly discovered. R 64-65, 71. 
However, the district court did not coherently address the claim in its ruling granting summary 
dismissal. Tr. 1/13/14, p. 18, ln. 1 - p. 26, ln. 25. 
The claim should have been properly addressed and a new sentencing hearing granted. 
Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a)(4) allows post-conviction relief where there exists evidence of 
material facts not previously presented and heard that requires vacation of the sentence in the 
interest of justice. To obtain this relief, a petitioner must present evidence of facts that existed at 
the time of sentencing that would have been relevant to the sentencing process and that indicate 
the information available to the parties or the trial court at the time of sentencing was false, 
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incomplete, or otherwise materially misleading. Bure v. State, 126 Idaho 253, 254-55, 880 P.2d 
1241, 1242-43. See also, Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 125, 952 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Ct. App. 
1998); and Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433,440, 163 P.3d 222,229 (Ct. App. 2007). 
With regard to recanted testimony, a new sentencing hearing should be granted when the 
recanted testimony reasonably could have affected the sentencing decision. Bean v. State, 124 
Idaho 187, 190,858 P.2d 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1993). In Bean, a new sentencing hearing was 
granted when the district court relied on false evidence to conclude that Bean's culpability in a 
murder was "great" while a co-defendant's culpability was "slight." The Court of Appeals held: 
Had the true facts been known to Judge Thomas, he may have chosen to impose 
upon Bean an indeterminate, rather than fixed, life sentence. Under these 
circumstances, the remedy sought by Bean - seeking a vacation of his sentence in 
the interest of justice - was appropriate. It follows that Bean's sentence should 
have been set aside and he should have been resentenced by the district court 
based on current information without regard to the original sentencing decision 
reached by Judge Thomas, inasmuch as the previous decision was tainted by 
perjurious and erroneous information thought correct at the time. 
Id, at 190-191, 858 P.2d at 331-332. 
In this case, the district court relied upon Mr. Rollins' statements in imposing a 30-year to 
life sentence. As noted in the court's comments at the sentencing hearing, the court relied upon 
Mr. Rollins' statement to the prosecutor in concluding that Mr. Reid was as or more culpable 
than Mr. Kienholz. And, as discussed above, it was Rollins' statements which were offered at 
sentencing and not at trial that showed Mr. Reid to be without pity or remorse, something that 
surely influenced the sentence imposed. As in Bean, there is now evidence that Mr. Rollins has 
recanted his statements, that the statements were the product of state bribery, that the statements 
were based upon reading police reports and co-defendant testimony rather than based upon 
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confessions or actions by Mr. Reid, and that Mr. Rollins is known to be a pathological liar. This 
evidence at the very least requires an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether Mr. Reid 
should be granted a new sentencing hearing. See Bean, supra. See also, Knutsen v. State, supra, 
reversing an order of summary dismissal where a neuropsychological evaluation raised a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether there exists evidence of material facts, not previously 
presented and heard, that requires a resentencing hearing. See also Vick v. State, supra. 
On this basis also, the order of summary dismissal should be reversed and the case 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Reid requests that this Court reverse the order of 
summary dismissal and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing. 
---~ 
Respectfully submitted this V day ofJuly, 2014. 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Appellant Corey Reid 
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